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NOTE AND COMMENT
TH. "SouRce oi LAW" JN THE PANAMA CANAL ZoNE.-A case just de-
cided in the Supreme Court of the United States, coming to that court from'
the Canal Zone, shows the great difficulties under which our courts libor when
they are called on to interpret and administer the'law in our extra-continental
possessions. The courts have apparently had the most difficulty in amalga-
mating the Roman law and the common law in cases involving questions of
delictual liability. In the case of Fernandez v. Perez (i9o6), 2o2 U. S. 8o,
the procedural question was presented as to the validity of an action on the
case for the wrongful levy of an attachment brought in the United States
District Court for the District of Porto Rico. A decision of the point in-
volved a discussion of the relation of torts to crimes in the Spanish law.
Such a discussion was presented in 6 MIcH. L. Rv. 136, i49, (1o7).
In Panama Railroad Company, Plaintiff in Error v. Theodore Bosse, U. S.
Sup. Ct. March 3, 1gg, the plaintiff in the lower court had been injured by'
a motor omnibus, negligently driven by a chauffeur of the Panama Railroad
Company at an excessive rate of speed through a crowded street in the
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Canal Zone. Suit was brought in the District Court of the Canal Zone. The
defendant argued, (x) that the common law liability of the master for his
servant could not be applied to this accident in the Canal Zone, (2) that there
can be no recovery for physical pain. The lower court ,decided for the plain-
tiff on both these points, and this decision was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court.
Using "source" in the sense of the instrumentality through which or the
persons by whom the rule of law is formulated, there are several questions
that naturally arise as to the "source of the law" of this case; namely, is it
found in the law of the old jurisdiction of Columbia or Panama, in the com-
mon law, in an amalgamation of the two, or, finally, may the law have come
from some other source? If the lower court had requested a brief from
counsel as to what the Panama law was on the doctrine of respondeat supe-"
rior, that question might have been settled at the beginning of the litigation,
and, at the final hearing, the Supreme Court would not hav-e been reduced to
clever guessing -as to the meaning of the several articles of the Civil Code
which deal with compensation for losses by illegal act.
An executive order of the President of the United States, issued on March
8, i9o4, had said, "The law of the land, with which the inhabitants are fa-
miliar. * * * will continue in. force in the Canal Zone." This was construed
to keep in force the Civil Code of the Republic of Panama, and it was argued
that the Civil Code as construed in- civil law countries "does not sanction
the application of the rule of respandeat superior to the present case". It
would seem that the phrase "with which the inhabitants are familiar" ought
to apply to those who inhabited the Panama Zone at the time of the issuance
of the President's order: i. e., in March, x9o4, and not, as the Supreme Court
suggests, to the inhabitants at the present time who are "only * * * the eni-
ployees of the Canal, the Panama Railroad, and the steamship lines and oil
companies permitted to do business in the Zone under license." The present
inhabitants are, as the court says, familiar with the. commoti law rule, but
the suggestion that the President's order applies to such -inhabitants and not
to those natives dwelling there in i9o4, when the Zone was first taken over,
adds to rather than decreases our bewilderment as to the relation of the com-
.mon law rule to the civil law provisions.
In the absence of any enlightenment from counsel in the case as to the
-actual character of the civil law on the point, the Supreme Court attempts to
show that Articles 2341, 2347 and 2349 of the Panama Civil Code are, at least,
not necessarily out of harmony with the common law doctrine of respondeat
sitperior,.and concludes that, "it would be a sacrifice of substance to form if
we should reverse the decision." And further, "we are by no means sure that
they (the native Courts) would not have decided as we decide." But, "at all
events" (italics not the Court's) "we are of the opinion that the ruling was
correct." In regard to the second point the opinion concludes with the
statement that, "it cannot be said with certainty that the Supreme Court of
the Zone was wrong in holding that under the Civil Code damages ought to
be allowed for physical pain. Fitzpatrick v. Panama Railroad Co., 2 Canal
Zone Sup. Ct. Rep. III, 2g9, 130."
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The decision is certainly a wise one and it commends itself as in accord-
ance with the well-established principles of the common law, but it leaves us
just where the District Court of the Canal Zone started so far as concerns
a definite answer to the questions above suggested. As a decision of our
court of last resort it makes perfectly good law and the decision in the Court
of the Canal Zone has already been followed as a useful precedent in the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals. Cf. Panama Railroad Co. v. Toppin,
250 Fed. Rep. 989. but it is submitted that if the Courts of the Canal Zone
could have determined at the beginning under what law they were acting, not
every case varying in some details from the instant case on its facts would
have to be carried to the Supreme Court of the United States for determina-
tion, and incidentally the perfectly innocent desire of the theorists might be
gratified by the determination of whether the "source of the law" is the Mod-
em Roman Law of Columbia or Panama, the Common Law of England or
the good old doctrine of Cicero that "lex nihil aliud nisi recta et a numine
deorum tracta ratio, jubens honesta prohibens contraria".
It would seem that in this instance also the rule of the survival of the
fittest in law is operating. Where the common law has come into conflict
with the Spanish-Roman or Dutch-Roman law in the English or American
dependencies the principles of the former have generally supplanted that of
-the latter. The English doctrine of "consideration" has proved superior to
the modem Roman law doctrine of "cause"- in Louisiana' and Cape Colony,
South Africa. 4 MICH. L. Rxv. ig, Cf. 20 LAw Qu.AT. Riv. 349. In the
instant case also the common law principle is victorious, although we are not
quite certain whether it has won because it was identical with the civil law
principle or because the case was finally determined by our Supreme Court.
'It should be noted also that this victory of the common law is in the field of
private law, not of public law, and thus seems out of harmony with Taylor's
generalization (Cf. "TM ScMNcZ ov JuRISPRUDgNC", p. XV), according to
which there is arising a composite law in these localities of mixed jurisdi--
tion "whose outer shell is English public law, *** and whose interior code
is Roman private law." J.H.D.
